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In the Suprente Court of ·the 
State of Utal1 
DALE BERKELEY WILSON, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
DR. MERRILL L. OLDROYD, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
CASE 
~0. 7969. 
RESPONDENT•s BRIEF ON APPELLANT'S 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
- PRELIMINARY STATEMENT . 
. The appellant bases his petition for a rehearing upon . 
four contentions, Each of his points was ·fully con~idered· 
by this Court in- arriving at its, decision, and the arguments 
advanced in the petition for rehearing were either expressly_ 
or impliedly rejected. The only contention that .:was not. 
expressly rul~ upon i$ the _fi.rst PQit:It urged by .appellant 
relating to the claimed depreciation of appellant's finances,. 
and we shall notice that one in most detail hereafter. On 
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2 
the other points we can best refer primarily to ow~ former 
brief and the decision of this Court which fully cover them. 
All appellant's present argument amounts to is that 
defendant's testimony should not have been believed. We 
shall point out h~reafter that the testimony was really con-
servative as to the wealth of the defendant, and that if thP. 
Court may, as appellant now contends, look outside the 
record, then there are other substantial property interests 
that were not included in the record. Ho\vever, a complete 
ans\ver at the threshhold appears to be that there is noth-
ing involved in the petition on that phase which indicates 
anything other than that the appellant does not agree \vith 
the values placed by the jury or this Court as to the matter 
of damages. No matter \vhat result is reached, appellant 
no doubt will never agree, in view of ·his persistence in the 
matter of interference with the marriage and his deter-
mination to avoid any substantial financial responsibility 
as indicated by the record. 
Before considering the points in order in more detail, 
however, we desire to note a matter contained in appel-
lant's preliminary statement, and a separate n1atter con-
tained in a letter addressed to the Chief Justice and appar-
ently accompanying appellant's Petition and Brief on Re-
hearing. The first, is the request of the appellant that the 
Chie.f Justice participate in the ruling on his motion, not-
withstanding the stipulation of the parties at the time of 
the oral argument, and notwithstanding the fact that Chief 
Justice Wolfe did not participate in the· decision deciding this 
case, and that the same situation has obtained \Vith respect 
to other cases similarly decided apparently without question 
from any source, and that four members of the Court which 
acted in this and numerous other cases are a constitutional 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
3 
com~t fully authorized to finally decide the issues under the 
law and the practice of the court. 
We have too ntuch confidence in Chief Justice Wolfe 
and this Honorable Court to suppose that the considera-
tions \Vhich brought about the original decision without his 
participation \vould be changed merely be·cause the result 
\Vent against the appellant, and because appellant asks for 
this special dispensation. We are confident that no differ-
ence in the result would be achieved by carrying such sug-
gestion out, but think it is uncalled for and unjustified. 
The additional request contained in the separate letter 
to the Chief Justice seems equally unusual and presump-
tuous. It is therein requested that the "Petition for rehear-
ing submitted herewith be set down for oral argument be-
fore the Court on an appropriate law and motion day." If 
all petitions for rehearing could be argued orally before 
their merits appeared from the briefs in support thereof, 
this Honorable Court could hardly perform its other work. 
Moreover, it does appear that this request .takes matters 
too much for granted, and in view of the petition's lack of 
merit, we do not think it is entitled to consideration. 
No merit appearing on the face of the petition and brief 
in support thereof, we do not think this case should be 
treated differently than any other case, and we are con-
fident that it will not be, despite the requests and sugges-
tions above mentioned. 
We turn now to the specific points covered by appel-
lant's arguments in support of this petition. 
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POINT ONE 
THE COURT AND THE JURY WHICH TRIED THE 
CASE IN THE COURT BELOW WERE UNDER NO rviiS-
APPREHENSION AS TO THE FINANCIAL WEALTH 
OF THlE DEFEl\TDANT AND DEFENDANT'S 0\VN 
SWO~RN TESTilVIONY SET OUT THAT FINANCIAL 
WEALTI-1 CONSERV:ATIVELY TO THE ADVANTAGE 
OF THE DEFENDANT. 
Appllant claims that the jury misapprehended the fi-
nancial wealth.of the defendant. Respondent introduced no 
independent evidence as to financial wealth, but relied whol-
ly on the defendant's O\vn sworn testimony, as the jury had 
the right to do. This evidence was considered under proper 
instruct~ons as to ptmitive damages. The statement in ap-
pellant's brief that counsel for plaintiff spent more, tima 
pointing out the wealth of the defendant than they did in 
arguing the merits of the case, can be explained only by 
the fact that presumably the one who wrote appellant's 
brief was not present at the trial. If he had been present, 
we are sure he would not have asserted this as a fact, any 
more than it would be true as to our arguments before tllis 
Court up to the present time. However, \Ve are nO\v im-
pelled by appellant's insistence to consider this matter of 
finances in some detail. 
The evidence was undisputed, and there was no testi-
mony on the point, except that of defendant himelf, which 
both sides accepted with its reasonable inferences and by 
which both sides are now bound. 
The comment of this Court that "Dr. Oldroyd is not 
only·· a successful practitioner, but also has considerable 
wealth in sheep, lands and other properties aggregating to 
several multiples of the judg1nent rendered against him" is 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
5 
attacked by the appellant. The only possible groWlds for 
attacking such statement would be to attack the veracity 
of the defendant hin1Self, and we· do not think it should lie 
in the n1outh of the appellant to attack this Court on the 
ground that his own s\vorn testimony should not have been 
given any .credence b~ the jury or this Court. Moreover, 
if \Ve may look outside the record as appellant now is seek-
ing to do, it is likely that his assets considerably exceed in 
value that \Vhich he admitted at the trial, as hereafter will 
be seen. 
It is no\V claimed by appellant that his ,Court miscon-
ceived the evidence with respect to finances. Certainly, 
the pWlitive damages of $5,000.00 fixed by this Court's 
mandate do not indicate any unrealistic attitude as. to ap-
pellant's finances, unless it is the substantial crinsideration 
accorded to appellant as indiGated by a $20,000.00 reduc-
tion in punitive damages. 
The ariDlillent of appellant on pages 7-8 of his brief 
purports to summarize his worth at the time of the trial as 
only $146,000.00 to $200,000.00 rather than as several times 
the amotmt of the judgment. As a preface to this, appel-
lant argues that the Court can take judicial notice of what 
happened to the ·livestock industry in the Spring of 1952. 
The first inference indulged in is that since Dr. Oldroyd 
gave his deposition, February 15th, 1952, and before the 
trial which occurred in the latter part of November, 1952, 
the value of his property depreciated. The fact is that 
when Dr. Oldroyd gave his depasition in February, 1952, 
he gave the value of sheep per head as $35.00, or a total of 
$94,000.00, without reference to his permits, \Vhich were 
separately referred to. Thereafter, when he had had full 
opportunity for consideration and consultation from the 
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standpoint of his O\vn interest, he corrected his deposition 
to read $30.00 per head, which would give him a total value 
of the sheep of $81,000.00. At the trial his deposition was 
introduced in evidence by plaintiff. If it had not correctly 
reflected values as of the time of trial, Dr. Oldroyd could 
have corected the deposition still again or explained what 
his true worth \Vas, but he was \Villing to submit the matter 
on his own estimates as to his worth, and did not question 
this evidence directly or indirectly. There was a very good 
reason for this, which will be apparent when we examine 
the question of what the Court might judicially know ac-
cording to counsel for appellant. l-Ie 1nust have known that 
his deposition placed his worth at much less than it really 
was if all the facts were inquired into . 
. Nor do we think it is sound to say that irrespective of 
what the evidence is in the record on values, and irrespec-
tive of the willingness of the appellant to accept that evi-
dence without question at the trial and until the decision 
of this Court, still a rehearing should be granted because 
appellant's petition for rehearing suggests that the Court 
can take judicial notice of a ·current economic condition in 
conflict with the valuations in the record as established by 
the defendant himself. Is it meant that if general condi-
tions have changed since a trial, a verdict should be in-
creased by an appellate court if the change is ascending, 
and reduced if the subsequent change is downward? Or is 
the contention that this Court should disregard the undis-
puted record in relation to values at the time of the trial, 
and. decide the cases in disregard of the jury's verdict on the 
basis of general ideas as to value based upon the theory 
of judicial notice, or some other theory? Either vie'v seen1s 
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so fraught ''"ith objection as to ha1·dly justify further ar-
gwnent. 
'\Ve also do not believe that judicial notice will permit 
this Court to revise the estimate of value which the record 
discloses and \Vhich, as \ve pointed out in our brief, indi-
cates the net worth of the defendant by his own testimony 
to be in excess of a quarter of a million dollars, or more 
than three times the original verdict of the jury and more 
than four times the existing judgment as reduced by this 
Court. If an ordinary citizen injures another by negligence 
in, for instance, an automobile accident, or by design in a 
·battery-case, it is not unusual for the court to enter judg-
ment which, to pay, may take everything which such de-
fendant possesses. It \vould seem no objection to an other-
\vis~ just judgment that after its satisfaction, Dr. Oldroyd 
may have something less than a quarter of a million dollars 
in assets rather than something over such amount, if by Dr. 
Oldroyd's present insistence this matter is even considered 
in ·connection with the total judgment. On the question of 
punitive damages as reduced by this Court, there would 
seem to be no point whatsoever in appellant's argument. 
Actually, the judgment being lawful and just, if it took 
everything he had this would -be no objection from a legal 
standpoint, and he should take some satisfaction in the 
thought that while he was interfering with the plaintiff's 
~home and holding out inducements to plaintiff's wife, he 
was willing to hazard everything he had for her, as it fin-
aly turns out, he is saving by far the greatest portion of his 
fortune which he did so persistently hazard. 
Appellant argues .in his brief that if any of his assets 
are sold to pay the judgment at a price above their purchase 
price, Federal income tax would apply. If the present val-
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ues \vere as nominal as. appellant indicates no\v, any capital 
gain would not be likely, but at best this seems a somewhat 
specious argument. His liquid assets alone, if considered 
at their true value, either by way of sale or borrowing, 
would permit him to pay off the judgment, leaving him his 
sheep herd, cattle, land and considerable additional property 
\Vhich, as we shall point out, could still well be \Vorth a quar-
ter of a million dollars. 
This vvill be a very favorable position in which he will 
be left compared with the position the evidence shows he 
left Dale Wilson and his home. This talk or suggestion of 
forced sale is nonsense, since the record indicates that ex-
cept for the judgment, he owes no one and that if he de-
sired, he could take care of this judgment with no substan-
tial difficulty-considerably less difficulty than is usually 
present in paying off the ordinary judgment by the ordinary 
individual. 
The appellant apparently had no difficulty in immedi-
ately putting up a good and sufficient supercedeas bond in 
the sum of $85,000.00. Of course, in the meantime, he may 
have felt free to adjust or dispose of his personal property 
by reason of this bond, but he apparently is in a better po-
sition than it was contemplated he n1ight have been \vhen 
the amount of the bond was fixed. 
These observations are pertinent to answer appellant's 
present argument and inferences, even upon appellant's 
theory of value, based upon matters which do not appear 
of r~cord but which appellant's counsel suppose justify them 
in ~a~ing the enumeration of values s.et out on page 8 of 
his brief. If the ability to pay the judgment is immaterial, 
as \Ve think it is, except as to punitive damages then ap-
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pellant's present argument and 1nuch of this answering ar-
gument should be disregarded, except as it negatives the 
contention that either this Court ·or the trial court miscon-
ceived the evidence as to finances. If they have any bearing, 
the misleading assertions in appellant's brief cannot be per-
mitted to stand unchallenged. Apparently appellant's enu-
meration has been arranged to indicate a total of just under 
t\vice the original judgment of $75,000.00, so as to permit 
appellant's criticism of this Court's language that he was 
worth several multiples the amount of the initial judgment. 
A mere cursory examination of appellant's enumera-
tion will show that this is so rmrealistic·as to almost·amount 
to a confession of this on its face. If this Court. be autho--
ized to disregard the record before the trial court and take 
judicial notice of the true facts, as appellant's argument 
seems to infer, defendant's wealth is even more impressive: 
than might otherwise be assumed. 
For instance, Dr. Oldroyd no\v itemizes the sheep at 
$10.00 per head,. instead of the $35.00 per head he .testified 
to in his deposition they \Vere worth, and instead of the 
$30.00 per head he later revised his figures to indicate. In 
other words, by some theory of depreciation or judicial no-· 
tice, notwithstanding he offered no evidence of this at .the 
trial, he now infers that between February, when he gave 
his deposition, and the time of. the trial, the value of his, 
sheep had decreased by 300%. We believe he considerably 
understated the value of his-property initially and failed· to 
mention considerable other property he owned. But even 
taking the $30.00 .or $35.00 per head figures which he gave 
and assuming the sheep were-only 2700 head at the· time of. 
the trial and notwithstanding that between February and 
the trial he would have had a substantial crop of lambs 
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ready for market, still a reference to the Commodity Year 
Book, 1953, indicates that between February and Novem-
ber, 1952, the decline in average prices received by farmers 
for sheep was substantially less than one-sixth of the de-
cline claimed by Dr. Oldroyd in the case of sheep and far 
less than that in the case of lambs. For the same period, 
the decline in the price of wool was less than 10%. Despite 
this, in November, 1952, if the Court can take judicial no-
tice of livestock prices, sheep were still selling, with sum-
mer permit, at more than $35.00 per head, and the winter 
permit would come extra. 
On this question of permits, Dr. ~Oldroyd's deposition 
gave the value of sheep without reference to permits, yet 
he has summer permit for 2695 head of sheep and a winter 
permit for 3000 head. A point is made that permits have 
no separate value or saleability. It is true that these per-
mits cannot be sold separately, but they can be waived by 
the owner of sheep and the summer as well as the \vinter 
permit each enhances the value of the sheep sold by at least 
$7.50 and usually by $10.00 per head or more. 
Appellant lists his cattle at $100.00 per head. The 
Conunodity Index shows the average price of cattle received 
by farmers in November, 1952, to be n1ore than 20c per 
pound, which would make any herd worth considerably in 
excess of what appellant claims, if composed of ordinary 
stock. If beef steers or any special type are involved, the 
price would be substantially higher. A minimwn value, it 
would seem, would be $150.00 per head. 
Dr. Oldroyd in his brief lists 4680 acres of range land, 
and sets the price at $5.00 per acre. If the Court may take 
judicial notice of the actual value for ordinary range land, 
that value, we believe, would be approximately $10.00 per 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
11 
acre and nlight be substantially more if choice range or a 
part of an integrated sheep operation were involved. How-
ever, actually Dr. Oldi·oyd testified that he had only 4500 
acres of range land, but 180 acres of pasture land. As an 
example of the desperate effort he has indulged in in his 
attempt to cut his \\~ealth do,vn several multiples of the 
original judgn1ent, it \Viii be noted that he has lumped the 
pasture land in \vith the range land, at $5.00 an acre. The. 
pasture land, near Payson, 1nust be \Vorth from $50.00 to 
$150.00 per acre. Appellant no\V values the automobiles, 
saddle horses and farm equipment testified to by him at a 
total of $4,000.00. It would be unusual if the two automo-
biles O\vned by him \vere not worth $4,000.00 alone, but the 
farm equipment and horses would probably bring the-
amount well above this figure. 
Appellant says that his accounts receivable are worth 
only a small percentage of their face value. There is noth-
ing in the record to show that those he specified were not. 
~llectible accoWlts, and it will not be presumed that he 
gave a value to, or included, worthless accounts, although. 
there may be some credit loss. He did not even mention 
his medical equipment, office equipment, life insurance, and· 
such things, which \Ve believe it is a fair inference he has, 
and \Vhich would be of substantial value. Nor does he, in 
his list, include the value of his grazing permits, his home 
or his bank account, nor his 1952 wool or lamb crop, nor his 
purely personal effects. His bank stock he shows at $12.50 
a share par, whereas 'he testified under oath in February, 
1952, that it \Vas valued at $30.00. There is no reason why 
every inference should be taken in his favor, and despite 
his later statement it was only $12.50 per share, par, there· 
is no question but that its actual value is the $30.00 p~r 
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share to which he originally testified. There is no evidence 
or any indication in the record or by judicial notice, that 
it has declined in value since his original testimony. 
Thus, it appears that the enwneration of .assets con-
tained on page 8 of appellant's present brief, his figures be-
ing set out in the first column below, must. be revised to 
accord with. the probable facts along the lines indicated in. 
the second column below: 
Appellant's Probable Minimum Present Claim Value 
2700 head of .sheep . $27,000 $81,000 
Minimum additional value 
by reason of summer& 
wi:nter permits No value set out $40,500 
50 head of cattle $5,000 $7,500 
4500 acres of range land · $23,400 $45,000 
(with pasture land) 
180 acres of pasture land No value beyond the 
above $5 per acre $9,000 
Accounts r~eivable $35,000 $30,000 
Secured debts $30,000 $30,000 
Government bonds $8,000 $8,000 
Miscellaneous automobiles, 
horses & farm equipment $4,000 $6,000 
I 000 shares bank stock $12,500 $30,000 
Home and office No value given $15,000 
Checking accormt No value given $2,000 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1953 \VOOl crop 
1952 lamb crop 




No value given 
No value given 
No value given 
No value given 
$4,000 
$307,000 
vVhere no probable nlinimum value is given in the last 
column above, \Ve feel the evidence may not be sufficient 
to permit a reasonably accurate estin1ate, although we also 
feel that the additional value would be substantial. Suffice 
it to say that the total on the right seems most conservative. 
If some of the values given do not appear expressly from the 
record, it is also true that the reduced values which appel-
lant now seeks to volunteer also do not appear, and in most 
cases, conflict \Vith the record. From the record or from 
any facts of \Vhich the Court can take judicial notice, we 
think the appellant's present claims are unsupported. We 
think that the least that can be said is \Vhat the Court said 7 
that the \Vealth of the· defendant was in several multiples 
of the judgment, and as \Ve stated in our original brief after 
quoting Dr. Oldroyd on values: 
"It thus appears that by Dr. Oldroyd's O\vn original 
valuations, he has property worth approximately $194,-
000.00 and in addition the folowlng property upon 
which he did not place a value: 50 ·head of cattle, 4,500 
acres of grazing land of which he had a deeded title, 
a winter permit for 3000 head of sheep and a summer 
permit for 2695 sheep, 180 acres of pasture land near 
Payson, two automobiles, farm eq1:1ipment, sad~~ h<?-r-
ses and a home. Considering the latter property ·as of 
minimum value, it seems fair to say that the defendant 
is worth wen over a quarter of a million dollars." 
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We have herein mentioned the defendant's wealth more 
than we have heretofore referred to it throughout all the 
course of this proceeding, when we have mentioned it only 
in passing in connection with punitive damages. We felt 
that discussion now has been made necessary by his nlis-
leading and unfair last-minute claims concerning his fi-
nances. Rather than attempt to protect himself against 
any improper evidence as to wealth, he is using his own 
representations in an atternpt to further reduce or avoid 
the effects. of the judgment. The evidence of his finances 
was properly received and properly submitted to the jury 
on the issue of punitive damages, which is not now ques-
tioned. We do not think the real issue should now be avoid-
ed; that the fixing of da1nages was a matter for the jury, 
and that certainly when this Court has reduced punitive 
damages to_$5,000.00, there is no further point in appellant's 
· present effort. . We think the opinion of this. Court itself 
is the best answer to this effort. 
POINT TWO 
THE COURT AND JURY IGNORED NO EVIDENCE 
GOING TO THiE NATURE OF THE MARRIAGE RELA-
TION, AND THE APPELLANT'S ARGUMENTS IN THIS 
RESPECT HAVE BEEN FULLY CONSIDERED AND 
PROPERLY RULED UPON. 
I;n his brief under the section corresponding to the fore-
going proposition in which appellant argues the contrary 
conclusion, it is urged by him, in a single paragraph, that 
the Court should reverse itself because plaintiff admitted 
that on two occasions he had some prior trouble with his 
wife. These same points were asserted and reiterated be-
fore the jury, on the motion for new trial, and before this 
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Cotu-1 in previous briefs. They \vere fully considered by 
this Court in its detennination. There seems no tnerit 
whatsoever in appellant's contention. At least one of these 
occasions \Vas probably before the discovery of Dr. Old-
royd's association but after its inception. Both were mat-
ters properly_ submitted to the jury under proper instruc-
tions. They, \Vith all other relevant circumstances, are dis-
posed of by the jury verdict and the decision of this Court. 
Concerning this point there \vould seem to be no purpose 
of repeating the discussion thereof in ow .. original brief and 
in appellant's prior briefs, \Vhich are hereby referred to. 
POINT THREE 
-THE OPINION OF THIS COURT IS SOUl~D IN 
HOLDING THAT THERE IS NOTHING FROM vVHICH 
IT CAt"~ BE DETERMINED THAT THE VERDICT WAS 
REACHED AS A RESULT OF PASSION AND PREJU-
DICE. 
Under the corresponding heading in appellant's brief, 
the case of Smith v. Sheffield, 58 Utah 77, 197 Pac. 605, is 
again refen--ed to, although it \Vas cited and fully exploited in 
the previous brief of appellant. As a matter of fact, the only 
cases cited in appellant's present brief which were not fully 
presented in previous briefs are Evans v. Gaisford, 247 P.2d 
431; Collins v. Hughes & Riddle, 278 1\TW 889; and Lehman 
v. Newnan Transit Co., Civil No. 97011, Third District 
Cow't. Evans v. Gaisford is entirely consistent with the rules 
adopted by this Court and is fully considered and cited in 
the Court's opinion herein. Collins v. Hughes & Riddle was 
a Nebraska case decided rnore than fifteen years ago,. and 
is one of the few cases that are in conflict with the long line 
of Utah cases considered and cited or referred to and fol-
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lowed by this Court in arriving at its decision herein. The 
decision of Judge Ellett in the District Court case for all that 
appears n1ay have been justified under the particular facts 
in that case, and involved the discretion and judgment of a 
fact finder on a motion for new trial, which judgment in 
the case at bar was ·contrary to appellant's contention. Be 
that as it may, this District Court opinion can hardly be 
held ·to overrule the decisions of this Court. Judge Hoyt 
declined to make any reduction on the motion for new trial 
by reason of the special facts before· him. Judge Ellett on 
another state of facts, did so. This Court has arrived at 
its O\vn judgment on appeal. 
In an· effort to show that the verdict \Vas excessive, 
appellant refers to a statement made by plaintiff a number 
of months before this action ·Was instituted and before Dr. 
Oldroyd had demonstrated a con1plete unwillingness to dis-
continue his interference with plaintiff's home in spite of 
promises, to the effect that $10,000 or $15,000 wouldn't hurt 
defendant very much. We \VOUld certainly agree that any 
such amount would not hurt him, but would be a mere li-
cense or invitation for a continuation of such conduct. Ap-
pellant indicates that since the jury brought back five times 
the amotmt the plaintiff so ufixed", a rehearing should be 
granted. or the verdict set aside. On the contrary, the 
amount fixed by. the plaintiff was the amount demanded in 
the complaint, $100,000.00. The mention of the first 
amounts can no more require a decrease of the a\vard below 
the $55,000.00 detern1ined by this Court than the mention 
I 
of the $100,000.00 in the complaint can require this Court 
to increase such award.· We do not·believe· that there can 
be any persuasion or merit in appellant's contention in this 
respect .. 
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POINT FOUR 
TillS COURT DID NOT ERR IN HOLDING TI-IA'f 
THERE WAS NO PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN THE IN-
STRUCTIONS, ... l\ND THE DECISION OF THIIS CO~URT 
IS SOU:t\TD AND \\7ELL CONSIDERED IN THIS RE-
SPECT. 
Appllant again urges that the giving of instruction No. 
6 \Vas prejudicial error, and says that this Court has ignored 
\vithout overruling \Vell established cases in this jurisdiction. 
Only one case is cited in this connection, the same one cited 
in support of the same contention in appellant's original 
brief. As in his original brief, appellant no\v mentions and 
emphasizes only a part of instruction No. 6, and ignores the 
several other instructions which positively instructed the 
jury in accordance \Vith the very law as to liability and dam-
ages which, apparently, appellant no\v is willing to concede 
is correct. 
Substantially the san1e argument no\v made was made 
by appellant in his prior brief and in the oral argun1ent 
before this Court. Reference is made to pages 50-52 of ap-
pellant's original brief in which the same argument is made 
as herein made, it being argued that the instruction said to 
the jury, "Even though the evidence may convince you be~ 
yond question that the marriage bet\veen the Wilsons was 
so strained that it appears that it could not have been re. 
paired, still you way (sic) not find on that basis, for in the 
eyes of the law so long as the marriage relationship existed, 
it may have been repaired and you may return damages on 
the basis that it would have been repaired.'' This interpre-
tation, as shown in our brief, was Unjustified by_ even- the-
fragment of instruction No. 6 selected by the appellant, and 
when considered in connection with the full instruction and 
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all the other instructions in the case, there could not have 
been any possible error or prejudice. The case relied upon 
had no application to the instructions in the instant case, 
as will be readily seen from a comparison of the instruc-
tions, neither of which the appellant has cared to quote in 
full, since their very statement would disprove his argu-
ment. 
In the instant case, unlike the Buckley case, it \Vas left 
entirely to the jury to determine the question of affection 
or lack of affection, and the damages· resulting in defend-
ant's interference, if any. In fact, Judge Hoyt was especial-
ly circumspect and liberal to the appellant in the instruc-
tions, stating, reiterating and reiterating that "if a person 
causes the wife to give up her affection, if any, for her hus-
band, or to desert or refuse to live with her husband, then 
he is liable in damages to the husband'' . . . . (Inst. 6) 
"If you find from the evidence tha:t plaintiff's wife deter-
mined to separate from the plaintiff because of the acts or 
conduct of the plaintiff and without wrongful encourage-
ment or inducement from the defendant, then the defendant 
should not be held liable; in any event you should not hold 
the defendant liable unless you find from a preponderance 
of the evidence that wrongful acts or conduct on the part of 
the defendant were the controlling cause of inducing the 
plaintiff's wife to withdraw her affection from plaintiff or 
to cease her association with him as his wife", (Inst. No.7) 
. . . "If you believe that plaintiff's wife fell in love 
with, or transferred her affection, to the defendant without 
any affirmative inducement or encouragement from the de-
fendant, then the defendant should not be held liable here-
in" (Inst. 5) . "If you believe that the acts or 
conduct of the plaintiff himself toward his wife, or any other 
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cause than the acts o1· conduct of the defendant constituted 
the controlling cause of plaintiff's \Vife's desertion of plain-
tiff, then the defendant should not be held liable'' (lnst. 4) 
"Unless you find from the preponderance of the evidence 
that the defendant intentionally encouraged and induced the 
plaintiff's \vife to give to him, the defendant, her love and 
affection, or to abandon her association with the plaintiff 
as his \Vife or to \Vithdra\v her affection from the plaintiff, 
then yow'" verdict on plaintiff's complaint should be for the 
defendant no cause of action" (Inst. 3) . . . "If you 
find from a preponderance of tl1e evidence and under the 
instructions of the court that the plaintiff is entitled to dam-
ages against the defendant then you should award plaintiff 
such amotu1t of damages as you believe from the evidence 
will constitute reasonable and just cornpensation for what-
ever loss or injury or mental or physical pain or suffering, 
if any~ resulted to plaintiff as a direct or proximate conse-
quence of \vrongful acts of the defendant set forth in the 
complaint . . . You should consider the state of feel-
ings existing between the plaintiff and ·his wife prior to the 
acts complained of . . . the probability or improba-
bility of the continuance of their association as husband 
and \Vife and whether the plaintiff suffered much or little 
because of defendant's acts . . . If you find the plain-
tiff is entitled to damages, award him reasonable and just 
compensation for whatever loss, injury, humiliation or pain 
or mental suffering, if any, you find from the evidence has 
been, or hereafter \Vill be, caused to plaintiff by defendant's 
acts complained of" (lnst. 8) . . . "You are the sole 
and exclusive judges of the facts in the case and it is. for 
you to decide whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to dam-
ages . . . If you find that the plaintiff is entitled to 
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damages, then you should consider the foregoing instruc-
tion in determining the amount of damages, but if you find 
that the plaintiff is not entitled to damages then you should 
entirely disregard the instruction of the court as to meas-
ure of damages." (Inst. 9) 
· \Ve will nqt attempt to further outline the instructions. 
The foregoing will indicate that the court was fair and gen-
erous ~with appellant in stating his theories, and that the 
arguments and reasoning of appellant now ignore the ac-
tual instructions given and the obvious difference between 
them and_ those jn the case relied upon. vVe submit that 
this Court's ·analysis and reasoning in ·view of the actual 
record iOn ·this point is a complete, and should be a final, 
answer . to these renewed contentions. 
CONCLUSIONS 
That these four points, as groundless as they appear, 
are the only criticism of the final decision of this Court in. 
a case ·so vigorously and persistently contested by the ap-. 
pellant·at every stage, and in view of the other attacks made 
upon the· judgment initially, bespeaks well for the decision 
in its present form. Because we have singled out these· four 
points- for discussion, and particularly the matter of finan-
ces, there, no doubt,· has been a tendency to over-emphasize 
them as does appellant's petition for rehearing. It is only in 
trying to meet these remaining argtunents that we are led 
into the discussion·, and we primarily rely upon our basic 
positions as stated in our principal brief, which brief is here-
by referred to for greater detail, and upon ·the· decision of 
this Court as a whole, which, we submit, is fair, sound and 
just and which we hereby refer to as a correct statement 
of the· law and the applicable rules, notwithstanding there-
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duction of the judgment as granted by this Court against 
us. Anyone reading only this brief and the brief in support 
of the petition for rehearing might \Veil lose sight of the 
really important phases of the decision, and \Ve thus desire 
to emphasize otu· belief that on the points mentioned by ap-
pellant no\v, as \\'ell as on the many equally as important 
or more important points apparently now conceded by ap-
pellant the decision is \veil considered and complete. 
There is nothing ne\v and substantial presented in the 
petition for rehearing and brief in support thereof. There 
is no justification for a rehearing in this case, and its only 
excuse \Vould be the persistence of the appellant to prevail 
herein and to avoid responsibility, which dete1mination is 
only a continuation of his persistence in pursuing his inter-
ference in Dale \'7ilson's home, commented on by the Court's. 
opinion herein, \Vilson v. Oldroyd, 267 P.2d 759 at p. 765. 
This persistence \vas repeatedly evident even after he had 
been detected and had promised Wilson that he would not 
interfere further. 
Counsel for appellant states that members of the Bar 
and the lay public with whom he has talked have expressed 
surprise and amazement at the size of· the verdict. We 
might indicate our observation that mem·bers of the lay 
public and the Bar with whom we have talked have ex-
pressed the feeling that the verdict was entirely proper in 
view of the special circumstances. Certainly the jury and 
the trial court sincerely so believed, and certainly this Court 
in its decision as to the reduced amount so believed. More-
over, it is generally believed that the institutions of home 
and marriage have received needed support and strength in 
the stand of the jury and the fairness and soundness of the 
decision of this Court. Everyone may not be completely 
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satisfied. Certainly the defendant will not be in any event, 
and the plaintiff could \Veil have regretted the reduction of 
$20,000 as granted the appellant by this Court. Courts, of 
course, do not function merely to satisfy either Mr. Oldroyd 
or Mr. Wilson, or others who may comment on the case. 
This Court having spoken, courageously but fairly, it is no 
reason for another result that Dr. Oldroyd and those to 
whom his counsel assume to refer may have views different 
than those expressed by others, or that others on the side-
lines may disagree with counsel for appellant. 
We submit that the case has been fully, carefully and 
fairly considered as it has progressed through the trial court 
and through this Court; that the points no\v urged by ap-
pellant are either entirely without merit or have, been prop-
erly and correctly resolved~ both as to law and fact; that the 
decision of this Court is sound and just; that there is no 
reason why special rules of procedure or substance should 
be extended to the appellant; that the decision of this Court 
should stand and that the Petition for Rehearing should be 
forthwith denied. 
A. ·H. CHRISTENSON 
A. SHERMAN CHRISTENSON 
PHILLIP V. CHRISTENSON 
for CHRISTENSON & CHRISTENSON 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and 
Respondent 
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